Skip to content
Latest alertWagyu XMR1 deployer key leaked via 1984.hosting breach; 5.2M XMR1 dumped on Hyperliquid for about $13.5M
0xCERT
All advisories
Medium0xCERT-2026-0389·

snark-verifier Halo 2 aggregation circuit mishandles point-at-infinity proof elements in MSM sum

snark-verifier before 0.2.6 (axiom-crypto) let a prover-controlled proof point encoded as the identity (0, 0) enter an EC sum that assumed non-identity inputs in Halo 2 recursive aggregation circuits. Upgrade snark-verifier to 0.2.6 and the patched halo2-lib.

Vuln-watch · relayed from the GitHub Advisory Database; see Source & attribution below

Summary

The Halo 2 aggregation circuit in axiom-crypto's snark-verifier could mishandle proof elements encoded as the point at infinity. When an assigned proof point appeared in an MSM term with constant scalar one, the Halo 2 loader passed it directly to halo2-lib's EccChip::sum, which used incomplete affine addition and assumed every input was a non-identity point. A prover-controlled proof point encoded as (0, 0) could therefore affect the MSM or accumulator computation.

Affected

  • snark-verifier (crates.io) versions before 0.2.6 (the advisory lists < 0.2.5 as the last known affected range)
  • Fixed in snark-verifier 0.2.6, together with the halo2-lib fix that makes EccChip::sum treat encoded identity inputs as no-ops (commit f53be0939e2accf0dd7672b1a4abe80af73dadf3)

Impact

Recursive aggregation circuits using the Halo 2 loader could compute an MSM or accumulator with an identity proof element in a code path that assumed non-identity inputs, breaking the expected handling of point-at-infinity proof elements. Per the advisory, practical exploitability depends on the surrounding aggregation and final-decider checks, hence the medium rating (CVSS 4.0 VI:L). No exploitation in the wild has been reported.

Recommended actions

  • Upgrade snark-verifier to 0.2.6 and pick up the patched halo2-lib EccChip::sum.
  • Rebuild and redeploy aggregation circuits and any generated verifiers that depend on the affected Halo 2 loader path.
  • Review whether your final-decider checks would have rejected identity proof elements.

Source & attribution

This 0xCERT advisory summarises the GitHub Security Advisory published by the axiom-crypto/snark-verifier maintainers: https://github.com/axiom-crypto/snark-verifier/security/advisories/GHSA-x26x-7f4v-cqx7 (CVE-2026-62337). Details may change; refer to the original source for the authoritative record.

OpenPGP-signed. The signed text of this advisory verifies against the 0xCERT key CCC7 D9EC 9415 723D.

Published 2026-11-20 · last updated 2026-11-20

curl -s https://www.0xcert.com/pgp.asc | gpg --import && curl -s https://www.0xcert.com/advisory/0xCERT-2026-0389/signed.txt | gpg --verify