Skip to content
Latest alertTENDRIL token on BNB Chain: sell-hook flaw lets attacker drain USDT from TENDRIL/USDT pool, about $309K-$555K lost
0xCERT
CERTEmergency response

When the chain is on fire, someone answers.

0xCERT is an independent, non-commercial CERT. We coordinate incident response, advisories, and stolen-fund recovery across smart contracts, bridges, wallets, and Web3 infrastructure — on every chain that matters.

● On-call now · 24/7 intake · initial triage within 24 hours

Built on CERT standards

Stolen in 2025
$2.1B+
across tracked exploits
Initial triage
< 24 h
from report to analyst
Chains monitored
40+
live health checks every 5 min
Coverage
24/7/365
on-call rotation

How response works

From first message to public advisory.

A repeatable playbook adapted from forty years of CERT practice to a world where the ledger is the crime scene.

  1. T+001

    You reach out

    Form, email, or a peer CERT. Partial information is fine — speed beats completeness.

  2. T+60s02

    On-call is paged

    A human analyst acknowledges and assigns a case ID (CASE-YYYY-NNNN).

  3. T+24h03

    Triage & containment

    War room with your team, exchanges, bridges, and wallet vendors to stop the bleeding.

  4. T+disclosure04

    Public advisory

    Post-mortem, IOCs, and remediation published — signed, numbered, and syndicated.

Mission

Nobody owns the incident. So we coordinate it.

Traditional CERTs were designed for IP networks, TLS certificates, and a small set of vendors. Blockchains have none of those assumptions. Code is the bank, the ledger is public, and the attacker keeps the funds the moment a transaction lands.

Protocols, bridges, wallets, validators, and exchanges all touch the blast radius of a single exploit, but none of them have the standing to coordinate the others. We do.

We are non-commercial, vendor-neutral, and chain-agnostic. We don't sell a product. We answer the phone, run the war room, publish the advisory, and feed the IOC list to everyone who needs it — for free.

Services

What we do, around the clock.

Full service catalog

Recent advisories

Coordinated disclosure, made public.

All advisories
Medium
Vuln0xCERT-2026-0313

TENDRIL token on BNB Chain: sell-hook flaw lets attacker drain USDT from TENDRIL/USDT pool, about $309K-$555K lost

A flaw in the TENDRIL token's sell hook on BNB Chain let an attacker drain almost all USDT from the TENDRIL/USDT pool on 5 Nov 2026. CertiK Alert estimates about $555K net loss; TenArmor first estimated about $309K. Avoid interacting with the TENDRIL/USDT pool and the TENDRIL token.

Low
Vuln0xCERT-2026-0310

CVE-2026-122049: A flaw has been found in Campcodes Bitcoin Wallet System 1

A flaw has been found in Campcodes Bitcoin Wallet System 1.0. This affects the function random_int of the file core/app/Http/Controllers/Auth/ForgotPasswordController.php. This manipulation causes improper restriction of excessive authentication attempts. Remote exploitation of the attack is possible. The attack's complexity is rated as high. It is indicated that the exploitability is difficult. The exploit has been published and may be used.

Critical
Vuln0xCERT-2026-0307

CVE-2026-107846: bitcoinjs-lib

bitcoinjs-lib is a JavaScript Bitcoin library for Node.js and browsers. From 2.3.0 until 5.2.1, 6.1.8, and 7.0.2, fastMerkleRoot pads odd Merkle-tree levels by hashing the final node with itself but does not report adjacent duplicate hashes. The affected block-root verifier was introduced as Block.checkMerkleRoot() alongside Block.calculateMerkleRoot(), while later versions expose validation through checkTxRoots() and __checkMerkleRoot; these validation paths can accept a recomputed root without checking for mutation. A peer can append duplicate transactions so a different transaction list re…

Active incident?

Don't wait. Triage starts the moment you reach out.

Funds moving, a key exposed, or a front-end serving malicious code — open a report and our on-call engineer is paged immediately. No contract, no retainer.