-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 0xCERT Security Advisory 0xCERT-2026-0389 ============================================================ Advisory-ID: 0xCERT-2026-0389 Severity: Medium Published: 2026-11-20T00:01:59.000Z Updated: 2026-11-20T16:45:11.498Z Chains: n/a URL: https://www.0xcert.com/advisory/0xCERT-2026-0389 Title: snark-verifier Halo 2 aggregation circuit mishandles point-at-infinity proof elements in MSM sum Summary - ------- snark-verifier before 0.2.6 (axiom-crypto) let a prover-controlled proof point encoded as the identity (0, 0) enter an EC sum that assumed non-identity inputs in Halo 2 recursive aggregation circuits. Upgrade snark-verifier to 0.2.6 and the patched halo2-lib. Details - ------- Summary The Halo 2 aggregation circuit in axiom-crypto's snark-verifier could mishandle proof elements encoded as the point at infinity. When an assigned proof point appeared in an MSM term with constant scalar one, the Halo 2 loader passed it directly to halo2-lib's EccChip::sum, which used incomplete affine addition and assumed every input was a non-identity point. A prover-controlled proof point encoded as (0, 0) could therefore affect the MSM or accumulator computation. Affected - - snark-verifier (crates.io) versions before 0.2.6 (the advisory lists < 0.2.5 as the last known affected range) - - Fixed in snark-verifier 0.2.6, together with the halo2-lib fix that makes EccChip::sum treat encoded identity inputs as no-ops (commit f53be0939e2accf0dd7672b1a4abe80af73dadf3) Impact Recursive aggregation circuits using the Halo 2 loader could compute an MSM or accumulator with an identity proof element in a code path that assumed non-identity inputs, breaking the expected handling of point-at-infinity proof elements. Per the advisory, practical exploitability depends on the surrounding aggregation and final-decider checks, hence the medium rating (CVSS 4.0 VI:L). No exploitation in the wild has been reported. Recommended actions - - Upgrade snark-verifier to 0.2.6 and pick up the patched halo2-lib EccChip::sum. - - Rebuild and redeploy aggregation circuits and any generated verifiers that depend on the affected Halo 2 loader path. - - Review whether your final-decider checks would have rejected identity proof elements. Source & attribution This 0xCERT advisory summarises the GitHub Security Advisory published by the axiom-crypto/snark-verifier maintainers: https://github.com/axiom-crypto/snark-verifier/security/advisories/GHSA-x26x-7f4v-cqx7 (CVE-2026-62337). Details may change; refer to the original source for the authoritative record. References - ---------- - - https://github.com/axiom-crypto/snark-verifier/security/advisories/GHSA-x26x-7f4v-cqx7 - - https://github.com/advisories/GHSA-x26x-7f4v-cqx7 - - CVE-2026-62337 - - https://github.com/axiom-crypto/halo2-lib/commit/f53be0939e2accf0dd7672b1a4abe80af73dadf3 - - https://crates.io/crates/snark-verifier/0.2.6 Verify with the 0xCERT OpenPGP key: https://www.0xcert.com/pgp.asc Fingerprint: 5F94 3ED1 1E50 CF31 2128 C493 CCC7 D9EC 9415 723D -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- wrsEARYKAG0FgmsAt7YJEDe9Tbcr+ZxrRRQAAAAAABwAIHNhbHRAbm90YXRp b25zLm9wZW5wZ3Bqcy5vcmfT04fTmHK9a4XB9BkS34zj6NOGxyFqJERzeUH6 P6+XQRYhBGCkkFZbJcT5QWu27ze9Tbcr+ZxrAAA4UAD+OYn3ukDi72GDm9wm MNV/WtCEppXTsX+I/dyjSNtY2S4BAJo5NXgF5zgDdrQQ/D1G40VGl1VYCVZi Wec0drK/yScP =3GkE -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----