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Medium0xCERT-2026-0341·

Sovryn XUSD/WRBTC AMM pool on Rootstock drained of about 541K XUSD via unverified fee-path output

On 1 Nov 2026 an attacker exploited an actual-receipt verification failure in Sovryn AMM fee processing on Rootstock, distorting XUSD/WRBTC reserves and receiving 541,456 XUSD (~$538.7K), later partly bridged out as BTC and ETH. The pool was delisted and AMM routes halted; users should not interact with Sovryn contracts.

Vuln-watch · relayed from the DeFiLlama hacks database; see Source & attribution below

Affected chainsOther / Multi-chainEthereumBitcoin

Summary

Sovryn reports that on 1 November 2026 at 18:42:46 UTC a single transaction exploited an actual-receipt verification failure in its AMM fee processing on Rootstock. The fee path accepted an output number without matching delivery; real WRBTC moved from the XUSD/WRBTC pool to the protocol collector, and the resulting reserve distortion enabled a large XUSD withdrawal. The transaction paid 541,455.998472 XUSD to an attacker-controlled wallet.

Affected

  • Sovryn AMM on Rootstock, XUSD/WRBTC pool
  • No fix available at time of publication: emergency fee-control changes were completed at 20:42:39 UTC on 1 November, the pool was delisted on 2 November, and SIP-0097 (executed 7 November) gated the AMM so the old router is rejected by all 15 known funded pools

Impact

Per Sovryn, the transaction produced a net pool-custody decrease of about 542,184.02 XUSD and 6.64633368 WRBTC, including protocol-held fee and collector movements; some of those assets remained under protocol control and LP losses are still being reconciled. Proceeds were converted and bridged: a 5.1 BTC payout (Bitcoin block 974167) and a 0.136089812171370854 ETH payout are confirmed. Exploitation is confirmed. Sovryn has not established that this attack and the 31 October lending exploit were controlled by the same operator. Separately, Sovryn reports that fifteen transactions on 4 November (04:14:50-04:59:36 UTC) extracted 69,381.254896 XUSD from Babelfish's reward inventory via a reward-calculation flaw; Babelfish minting and redemptions are stopped.

Recommended actions

  • Sovryn users and LPs: do not use Sovryn or interact with its contracts, including through alternative interfaces, until further notice (per Sovryn).
  • Beware of "refund" or "migration" scams: Sovryn will never message first or ask for seed phrases or contract approvals.
  • Exchanges, bridges and service providers: screen funds from the Rootstock/Ethereum and Bitcoin addresses below.

Indicators

Sovryn lists 0x101d1dc6e2164d6091ace64701e301f4535665ba (Rootstock and Ethereum) and bc1qtzt5vy5qssteyn2ky7u472754a8jgtx9cxzs9m (Bitcoin payout) as associated with the second incident, and links the primary AMM exploit transaction and the first Babelfish reward-extraction transaction.

Source & attribution

This 0xCERT advisory summarises Sovryn's incident report (https://forum.sovryn.com/t/sovryn-incident-report-31-october-1-november-2026/3609) and attack disclosure (https://forum.sovryn.com/t/sovryn-attack-disclosure-bob-rootstock-and-babelfish/3612), corroborated by DefiLlama's hacks dataset. Details may change; refer to the original source for the authoritative record.

Indicators of compromise

All IOC feeds →
  • address0x101d1dc6e2164d6091ace64701e301f4535665ba
  • address0x101d1dc6e2164d6091ace64701e301f4535665ba
  • addressbc1qtzt5vy5qssteyn2ky7u472754a8jgtx9cxzs9m
  • tx0x20c7d741b844a08d5d5190b49ad2651f29a0eca5f7dad6d1b4dc9228a009762f
  • tx0x4723e77d883302668d015a7305f61cbb47b1ac0a56bd4cb0feb277b8ba0b6d03

OpenPGP-signed. The signed text of this advisory verifies against the 0xCERT key CCC7 D9EC 9415 723D.

Published 2026-11-03 · last updated 2026-11-11

curl -s https://www.0xcert.com/pgp.asc | gpg --import && curl -s https://www.0xcert.com/advisory/0xCERT-2026-0341/signed.txt | gpg --verify