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Medium0xCERT-2026-0373·

Curve CowSwapBurner ERC-1271 check ignored order hash; 138 forged CoW orders stole about $38.2K of DAO fees

Curve's CowSwapBurner on Ethereum approved CoW Protocol orders without binding them to the order hash, letting an attacker sell about $38.2K of accumulated DAO fee tokens to their own address on 10 Nov 2026. No user funds affected; burner disabled. Operators of forks of this burner should check their isValidSignature() now.

Vuln-watch · relayed from a public source; see Source & attribution below

Affected chainsEthereumArbitrum

Summary

On 10 November 2026 an attacker stole about $38,200 of Curve DAO fee revenue from Curve's CowSwapBurner contract on Ethereum, per Curve's incident disclosure. The burner's ERC-1271 isValidSignature() checked that the order described in the signature data was a genuine burner order but ignored the _hash parameter, so it never checked that this was the order CoW Protocol was executing. The attacker settled 138 forged CoW Protocol orders selling 135 accumulated fee tokens for 38,205.76 USDC paid to their own address. Curve says no user funds, pools, lending markets or crvUSD were affected.

Affected

  • Curve CowSwapBurner on Ethereum (deployed 12 June 2024), plus third-party deployments derived from its public code
  • Fix: the Emergency DAO disabled fee collection and exchange on the Ethereum FeeCollector at 13:59 UTC on 10 November (and on Arbitrum and Base at 16:55 UTC as a precaution). DAO vote 1524, closing 20 November 2026, proposes a replacement burner that requires the supplied hash to match the checked order.

Impact

While the burner's exchange window was open, anyone could submit an order in the burner's name selling any token it held, for any token and to any receiver, by attaching a genuine burner order as signature data. Exploitation in the wild is confirmed: the forged orders settled between 00:07 and 11:10 UTC on 10 November, mostly for balances below the burner's 500 crvUSD sale minimum. Per Curve, the attacker swapped proceeds to ETH, split them across four addresses, bridged to Arbitrum and deposited 37,229.89 USDC into Hyperliquid, where it was exchanged for 65.41 XMR1; on 15 November the remaining 594 USDC was swapped to ETH and 0.3 ETH was deposited into Tornado Cash. The funds have not been recovered.

Recommended actions

  • Operators of contracts derived from Curve's CowSwapBurner, or any ERC-1271 contract that validates CoW Protocol (GPv2) orders: confirm isValidSignature() binds the decoded order to the _hash argument; if it does not, disable order approval and revoke the CoW Protocol vault-relayer allowances until fixed.
  • Curve DAO participants: review DAO vote 1524 (replacement burner).
  • Treat the indicators below as malicious and monitor them for fund movements.

Indicators (per Curve's disclosure)

  • 0x356E0178B0f07fe7d97C3A61e502cE52bc5564B8 (Ethereum): attacker's address
  • 0x1b4c0fe616a35217ad177169eab7e2331a0c27632d8cdd61e689db8a923100e1 (Ethereum): first forged order
  • 0x868dba0d821b76b6d6e7746f6479d82c049439c6e87bff9be80fd62b50b87fba (Ethereum): last forged order
  • 0xf3ed011840e2d1ebd1511c4b45c81840f8810b81d8cd290892f5a2e9a581d114 (Ethereum): swap of remaining USDC ahead of Tornado Cash deposits
  • 0xCC7a8aD339d319115fdEac897c67B46ED333F77B, 0xCfbc16b35907540f4C9E61e8588987929951D33E, 0xd8e2c01fF9039125629d0141dCAf06242775aa6a, 0x670C0d1C980aB07649Df9a5e60635aC32d5916Ab (Arbitrum): addresses that funded the Hyperliquid bridge deposits of the stolen funds

Source & attribution

This 0xCERT advisory summarises Curve Finance's incident disclosure: https://github.com/curvefi/security-incident-reports/blob/main/disclosures/2026-11-10.md . Details may change; refer to the original source for the authoritative record.

Indicators of compromise

All IOC feeds →
  • address0x356e0178b0f07fe7d97c3a61e502ce52bc5564b8
  • address0x670c0d1c980ab07649df9a5e60635ac32d5916ab
  • address0xcc7a8ad339d319115fdeac897c67b46ed333f77b
  • address0xcfbc16b35907540f4c9e61e8588987929951d33e
  • address0xd8e2c01ff9039125629d0141dcaf06242775aa6a
  • tx0x1b4c0fe616a35217ad177169eab7e2331a0c27632d8cdd61e689db8a923100e1
  • tx0x868dba0d821b76b6d6e7746f6479d82c049439c6e87bff9be80fd62b50b87fba
  • tx0xf3ed011840e2d1ebd1511c4b45c81840f8810b81d8cd290892f5a2e9a581d114

OpenPGP-signed. The signed text of this advisory verifies against the 0xCERT key CCC7 D9EC 9415 723D.

Published 2026-11-18 · last updated 2026-11-18

curl -s https://www.0xcert.com/pgp.asc | gpg --import && curl -s https://www.0xcert.com/advisory/0xCERT-2026-0373/signed.txt | gpg --verify