LUKSO email-recovery service compromised; attacker key added to ~300 Universal Profiles, about 1.4M LYX stolen
An attacker exploited the backend of LUKSO's email-based recovery service on 18 Nov 2026, added their own controller key to about 300 Universal Profiles and took about 1.4M LYX. Affected users must remove the attacker controller key and the recovery-UP controller.
Vuln-watch · relayed from a public source; see Source & attribution below
Summary
On 18 November 2026 LUKSO disclosed that an attacker found a security hole in the backend of its email-based recovery system, an off-chain service that helped users regain access to their Universal Profile. Through it the attacker took control of the recovery service's "recovery" Universal Profiles and used it to add their own controller key to about 300 Universal Profiles, then used that key to move about 1.4M LYX out of them. LUKSO says the LYX was bridged to Ethereum and swapped through DEXs such as Uniswap for about 50 ETH (about $95k).
Affected
- Universal Profiles on LUKSO that had LUKSO's email-based recovery enabled (the "recovery-UP" controller)
- The recovery service is switched off and being decommissioned; no on-chain fix is needed. Per LUKSO, the LUKSO blockchain, Universal Profile contracts, private keys and recovery phrases were not affected.
Impact
The attacker controller key can move assets out of any profile where it remains a controller. LUKSO said on 19 Nov that about 150 profiles had still not taken the recommended steps. Loss figures differ: LUKSO cites about 1.4M LYX and about $95k realised; The Defiant valued 1.4M LYX at about $330k at market price; DefiLlama lists $496k. LUKSO says a reimbursement plan will follow in the coming weeks.
Recommended actions
- Check whether your profile is affected at https://incident-check.lukso.tools/ (LUKSO's official checker).
- Remove the attacker controller key
0xa2f8Fd85366d1B4A3B13C33A48CD959F6D1Ba3a7via https://authorize.universalprofile.cloud/authorize; per LUKSO it may not appear in your controller list. Then remove the recovery-UP controller completely, and make a file backup. - Monitor or block the addresses listed in the indicators.
Source & attribution
This 0xCERT advisory summarises LUKSO's post-mortem: https://medium.com/@lukso/post-mortem-security-incident-in-the-email-based-recovery-system-029f6f241e2b and alerts by @LUKSO_io: https://x.com/LUKSO_io/status/2122954621253464215, https://x.com/LUKSO_io/status/2123364877473304711, with independent on-chain analysis by The Defiant: https://thedefiant.io/news/security/lukso-blames-email-recovery-flaw-for-profile-thefts. Details may change; refer to the original source for the authoritative record.
References
- https://medium.com/@lukso/post-mortem-security-incident-in-the-email-based-recovery-system-029f6f241e2b
- https://x.com/LUKSO_io/status/2122954621253464215
- https://x.com/LUKSO_io/status/2123030837608186321
- https://x.com/LUKSO_io/status/2123364877473304711
- https://thedefiant.io/news/security/lukso-blames-email-recovery-flaw-for-profile-thefts
Indicators of compromise
All IOC feeds →- address0x4d2bfb7ca38cb3ea136845a9dd0fbeace2cd365cAddress holding ~50 ETH proceeds of stolen LYX, per LUKSO · Ethereum
- address0xa2f8fd85366d1b4a3b13c33a48cd959f6d1ba3a7Attacker controller key added to Universal Profiles, per LUKSO · LUKSO
OpenPGP-signed. The signed text of this advisory verifies against the 0xCERT key CCC7 D9EC 9415 723D.
Published 2026-11-18 · last updated 2026-11-19
curl -s https://www.0xcert.com/pgp.asc | gpg --import && curl -s https://www.0xcert.com/advisory/0xCERT-2026-0380/signed.txt | gpg --verify