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Medium0xCERT-2026-0358·

Luxor Commander abused to redirect Bitcoin miners' hashrate to attacker pool address; patched, clients to be compensated

Luxor confirms an attacker abused its Commander mining fleet-management software to redirect hashrate of just over a dozen client accounts to another pool. Commander was patched within 2 hours. Operators should verify pool and payout settings on all machines.

Vuln-watch · relayed from a public source; see Source & attribution below

Affected chainsBitcoin

Summary

Bitcoin mining software provider Luxor says its internal monitoring detected an unauthorized redirect of hashrate through Commander, its fleet-management software for mining operations. Affected machines were pointed at a different pool for a limited window. Hosting provider CoreX Hosting separately warned of an ongoing "big miner hack" in which miners were being pointed at the OCEAN pool with a specific BTC payout address.

Affected

  • Luxor Commander (hosted fleet-management software); Luxor reports "just over a dozen client accounts" affected
  • Fixed: Luxor says Commander was patched within 2 hours and affected machines are being restored to their original pool settings. No user action required, according to Luxor.

Impact

An attacker abused Commander to change the pool configuration of client mining machines, redirecting their hashrate (and the resulting payouts) to an attacker-chosen pool and address. Luxor says no data was leaked or exfiltrated from its systems and that every affected client will be paid in full for the redirected hashrate. Exploitation in the wild is confirmed by Luxor. Luxor has not yet published a root cause and says a full post-mortem will follow.

Recommended actions

  • Mining operators using Commander or any remote fleet-management tool: check the pool URLs, worker names and payout addresses configured on every machine and restore any unexpected changes.
  • Alert on changes to pool configuration and on hashrate drops at your expected pool.
  • Treat the payout address below as attacker-controlled; do not accept it in pool configurations.
  • Watch for Luxor's post-mortem for root cause and any further guidance.

Indicators

  • bc1qphukp9rjfc4rcej7erpm9ae20xmtspw8pcddrr: BTC address hijacked miners were pointed at (via OCEAN pool), per CoreX Hosting

Source & attribution

This 0xCERT advisory summarises a disclosure by Luxor (@luxor): https://x.com/luxor/status/2122018094914601464, and a real-time alert by CoreX Hosting (@CoreX_Hosting): https://x.com/CoreX_Hosting/status/2121802488898863443. Details may change; refer to the original sources for the authoritative record.

Indicators of compromise

All IOC feeds →
  • addressbc1qphukp9rjfc4rcej7erpm9ae20xmtspw8pcddrr

OpenPGP-signed. The signed text of this advisory verifies against the 0xCERT key CCC7 D9EC 9415 723D.

Published 2026-11-15 · last updated 2026-11-16

curl -s https://www.0xcert.com/pgp.asc | gpg --import && curl -s https://www.0xcert.com/advisory/0xCERT-2026-0358/signed.txt | gpg --verify