Sovryn lending and margin on Rootstock exploited for about $914K via unverified swap output used as collateral
On 31 Oct 2026 three transactions exploited Sovryn's Rootstock lending/margin contracts, which accepted a malicious conversion route's reported output as collateral without tokens arriving; net attacker proceeds were 604,575 XUSD and 4.03 WRBTC (~$914K). Lending is paused; Sovryn advises users not to interact with its contracts.
Vuln-watch · relayed from the DeFiLlama hacks database; see Source & attribution below
Summary
Sovryn reports that three transactions on 31 October 2026 (08:34:25, 15:50:12 and 15:53:45 UTC) exploited its lending and margin contracts on Rootstock. A malicious conversion route reported swap output that the lending system accepted as collateral even though the corresponding tokens had not arrived, and real assets then left pooled lending custody against those unsupported records. Sovryn values the net attacker proceeds at about $914,000.
Affected
- Sovryn protocol lending, borrowing and margin trading on Rootstock
- No fix available at time of publication: the core protocol was paused at 20:10 UTC and the lending pools at 20:17-20:19 UTC on 31 October; Sovryn says repairs and independent security review are in progress
Impact
Per Sovryn's disclosure, net attributable attacker proceeds were 604,575.193896 XUSD and 4.02606509 WRBTC (plus a 0.00186 WRBTC financing fee). A further 66,134.071550 XUSD across seven withdrawal requests was held by Sovryn's 24-hour "Perimeter" withdrawal delay and blocked before reaching the attacker. Lending-pool withdrawals and position management remain unavailable. Exploitation is confirmed. Sovryn has not established whether this incident and the 1 November XUSD/WRBTC AMM exploit were carried out by the same operator.
Recommended actions
- Sovryn users: do not use Sovryn or interact with its contracts, including through alternative interfaces, until further notice (per Sovryn); follow Sovryn Discord #announcements.
- Beware of "refund" or "migration" scams: Sovryn says it will never message first or ask for seed phrases or contract approvals.
- Exchanges, bridges and service providers: screen funds from the Rootstock addresses below.
- Lending protocols: verify actual token receipt (balance deltas) instead of trusting swap-route return values when crediting collateral.
Indicators
Sovryn lists 0x740a2ecba7c291473d88ed8ae7a310c3c32d8d4a and 0x643234de31619ded5496ba30d0b6b97791e959fd as Rootstock addresses associated with this incident, and links the three exploit transactions. Sovryn notes that listing does not establish that one operator controls every address.
Source & attribution
This 0xCERT advisory summarises Sovryn's incident report (https://forum.sovryn.com/t/sovryn-incident-report-31-october-1-november-2026/3609) and attack disclosure (https://forum.sovryn.com/t/sovryn-attack-disclosure-bob-rootstock-and-babelfish/3612), corroborated by DefiLlama's hacks dataset. Details may change; refer to the original source for the authoritative record.
References
Indicators of compromise
All IOC feeds →- address0x643234de31619ded5496ba30d0b6b97791e959fdSovryn lending exploit (31 Oct): address tied to attack txs 2-3, per Sovryn · Rootstock
- address0x740a2ecba7c291473d88ed8ae7a310c3c32d8d4aSovryn lending exploit (31 Oct): address tied to first attack tx, per Sovryn · Rootstock
- tx0x355107e10fd887c7c7b433cf8d281035ae6c90a28d19e3c2e313ae81fd7e3c78Sovryn lending exploit: first attack transaction (31 Oct 08:34 UTC), per Sovryn · Rootstock
- tx0xbde182addcb9cd4afdf834e88763f64c72c311518e4fe34ebd175e15d98203cbSovryn lending exploit: third attack transaction (31 Oct 15:53 UTC), per Sovryn · Rootstock
- tx0xf6c947194ef8b73bfa4cf1e8ec72dab47ed719e9d1ffb1f28269f0a84c80819bSovryn lending exploit: second attack transaction (31 Oct 15:50 UTC), per Sovryn · Rootstock
OpenPGP-signed. The signed text of this advisory verifies against the 0xCERT key CCC7 D9EC 9415 723D.
Published 2026-11-03 · last updated 2026-11-11
curl -s https://www.0xcert.com/pgp.asc | gpg --import && curl -s https://www.0xcert.com/advisory/0xCERT-2026-0340/signed.txt | gpg --verify