Ethersphere bee-js 13.3.0 and Swarm Desktop 0.56.2 trojanised to steal Bee node wallet keys and install a backdoor
Attackers abused Ethersphere's release pipeline to publish @ethersphere/bee-js 13.3.0 (npm) and Swarm Desktop 0.56.2, which exfiltrate the Bee node config.yaml and swarm.key and install a remote backdoor. Treat any host that installed them as compromised, move node funds to a new key, and pin bee-js to 13.2.0.
Vuln-watch · relayed from a public source; see Source & attribution below
Summary
On 9 November 2026 attackers used Ethersphere's own release automation (the bee-worker release account, described by SafeDep as a likely compromised release bot) to publish a malicious @ethersphere/bee-js 13.3.0 to npm and a trojanised Swarm Desktop 0.56.2 "emergency patch release" on GitHub. SafeDep reports that the npm version was published at 00:09 UTC and removed by npm at 01:24:58 UTC; Swarm Desktop 0.56.2 was published at 00:36 UTC. SlowMist records the incident as a supply-chain attack with no confirmed fund losses.
Affected
- @ethersphere/bee-js 13.3.0 (npm). The last clean version is 13.2.0, and the npm "latest" tag points to it again (SafeDep).
- Swarm Desktop 0.56.2 (all installers from the same CI build are presumed trojanised; the linux amd64 .deb was unpacked and the loader confirmed by SafeDep).
- Projects whose dependency ranges resolved to bee-js 13.3.0 during the publication window; check lockfiles and CI logs.
Impact
Stage 1: a postinstall hook (bee-js) or loader (Swarm Desktop) fetches and runs a remote payload with the installing user's privileges. Stage 2: the payload reads the Swarm Desktop config.yaml (which holds the keystore password) and data-dir/keys/swarm.key and sends them to the attacker, exposing the node's private key and funds. Stage 3: on Linux/macOS a Go remote shell ("evjawbreaker") persisting under ~/.solidity/ via a systemd user unit (solidity-langsupport-runner.service) or LaunchAgent (com.solidity.langsupport.runner), which reads its C2 hub address from an Ethereum mainnet contract; on Windows a UAC bypass followed by a silently installed, legitimately signed ScreenConnect 25.4.3 client running as SYSTEM (service "ScreenConnect Client (5cbe79c9c25524df)"). No confirmed fund losses at time of publication (SlowMist).
Additional network indicators from SafeDep (not machine-listed below): C2 hub 193.57.9.155:4912 (TLS), rogue ScreenConnect relay 185.232.84.169:8041, C2 gate header "X-Ethersphere: 1". SafeDep publishes 65 stage-2/3 indicators, including file hashes, at https://safedep.io/data/blogs/ethersphere-bee-js-stage2-3-iocs.csv
Recommended actions
- Treat any machine that installed bee-js 13.3.0 or Swarm Desktop 0.56.2 as fully compromised; rotate secrets from a clean device.
- Move the Swarm node's funds and stake to a new key generated on a clean device, and treat the old key as stolen.
- Remove the backdoor: delete ~/.solidity/ and its systemd user unit or LaunchAgent; on Windows remove the "ScreenConnect Client (5cbe79c9c25524df)" service.
- Pin @ethersphere/bee-js to 13.2.0 (or a later clean release) and reinstall Swarm Desktop only from a release Ethersphere confirms as clean.
- Block the domains and URLs listed in this advisory and monitor JSON-RPC traffic for eth_call requests to the C2 contract.
Source & attribution
This 0xCERT advisory summarises the analysis by SafeDep (https://safedep.io/blog/ethersphere-bee-js-npm-compromise), corroborated by SlowMist's incident record (https://hacked.slowmist.io/), which references Ethersphere/Swarm's statement (https://x.com/ethswarm/status/2119764040008491491). Details may change; refer to the original sources for the authoritative record.
References
Indicators of compromise
All IOC feeds →- address0x6a82595eeea0f4fdfb3ae13a2687bcbbe626e94bSecond C2 dead-drop contract (same getters) - per SafeDep · Ethereum
- address0xa7b15a2b5f6992dc3babb946375d6895ff1171bfSecond operator wallet, deployer of second C2 contract - per SafeDep · Ethereum
- address0xf8a900db50b3331be6b768ba460bb59f3e40c344C2 dead-drop contract (implant reads hub address) - per SafeDep · Ethereum
- address0xfd3fc58bcbd8ccc77b6000201438edfc636e7ca7Operator wallet: deployer/owner/only writer of C2 contract - per SafeDep · Ethereum
- domainapi.frameworkmetrics.xyzEthersphere bee-js/Swarm Desktop malware C2 (payload + exfil) - per SafeDep
- domainframeworkmetrics.xyzEthersphere bee-js/Swarm Desktop malware C2 domain - per SafeDep
- urlhttps://api.frameworkmetrics.xyz/v1/analyticsStage-2 payload endpoint (bee-js 13.3.0 postinstall loader) - per SafeDep
- urlhttps://api.frameworkmetrics.xyz/v1/assets/Stage-3 implant download prefix - per SafeDep
- urlhttps://api.frameworkmetrics.xyz/v1/electronStage-2 payload endpoint (Swarm Desktop 0.56.2 loader) - per SafeDep
- urlhttps://api.frameworkmetrics.xyz/v1/swarm/reportExfil endpoint for Swarm config.yaml + swarm.key - per SafeDep
OpenPGP-signed. The signed text of this advisory verifies against the 0xCERT key CCC7 D9EC 9415 723D.
Published 2026-11-09 · last updated 2026-11-10
curl -s https://www.0xcert.com/pgp.asc | gpg --import && curl -s https://www.0xcert.com/advisory/0xCERT-2026-0332/signed.txt | gpg --verify