CoreVault on BNB Chain: flash-loan oracle attack inflates redemption about 33x and drains InsurancePool of about $112K
A flash-loan-funded oracle manipulation let an attacker redeem from CoreVault at about 33x fair value, draining its InsurancePool on BNB Chain; CertiK puts the attacker's take at 160.26 BNB (~$112.2K). Avoid the contracts until a fix is published and screen the listed indicators.
Vuln-watch · relayed from a public source; see Source & attribution below
Summary
CertiK Alert reported that a flash-loan-funded oracle attack on BNB Chain inflated a CoreVault redemption by about 33x and depleted the associated InsurancePool. Per CertiK, the attacker was left with 160.26 BNB (about $112.2K) after reversing the trade. TenArmor separately flagged a suspected attack on the InsurancePool and CoreVault contracts with losses of about $112.3K. The exploit transaction was mined on 3 November 2026 (UTC); CertiK's alert followed on 4 November.
Affected
- CoreVault / InsurancePool contracts on BNB Chain (contract addresses and project team not identified by the sources)
- Fixed in: No fix or post-mortem announced at time of publication
Impact
According to CertiK, the attacker used a flash loan to manipulate the price oracle used by CoreVault, so a redemption paid out roughly 33 times its fair value, with the excess drawn from the InsurancePool. Funds were drained in a single exploit transaction. Exploitation in the wild is confirmed by the sources. No recovery or compensation plan had been announced at time of publication.
Recommended actions
- Do not deposit into or interact with CoreVault / InsurancePool until the team publishes a post-mortem and fix.
- Protocols that price redemptions from AMM spot prices should switch to manipulation-resistant oracles (TWAP or external feeds) and cap per-transaction redemption sizes.
- Wallets, exchanges and screening providers: add the indicators below to monitoring to flag movements of the stolen BNB.
Indicators
- Exploit transaction hash as published by CertiK Alert.
- Attacker EOA and exploit contract are the sender and the contract created by that transaction, as recorded on-chain (BNB Chain receipt for the CertiK-cited transaction, block 131507810).
Source & attribution
This 0xCERT advisory summarises an alert by CertiK Alert: https://x.com/CertiKAlert/status/2117807084939129050, corroborated by TenArmor's alert as reported by Phemex News: https://phemex.com/news/article/insurancepool-and-corevault-contracts-on-bsc-hit-by-suspected-attack-112k-lost-102297. Details may change; refer to the original source for the authoritative record.
References
- https://x.com/CertiKAlert/status/2117807084939129050
- https://bscscan.com/tx/0x072a10a579e2a8afa26a681205a2aaaa38f74bcb9d1064b12bd9e9ebe2c598b3
- https://phemex.com/news/article/insurancepool-and-corevault-contracts-on-bsc-hit-by-suspected-attack-112k-lost-102297
- https://www.techflowpost.com/en-US/newsletter/142845
Indicators of compromise
All IOC feeds →- address0xc28cfeee046e1421e9dbfb2cf689074bf9f387e2Exploit contract - created by the CertiK-cited CoreVault exploit tx (on-chain) · BNB Chain
- address0xd3565b191b28b49cc517189b984dacdb1ff05304Attacker EOA - sender of the CertiK-cited CoreVault exploit tx (on-chain) · BNB Chain
- tx0x072a10a579e2a8afa26a681205a2aaaa38f74bcb9d1064b12bd9e9ebe2c598b3CoreVault exploit transaction - per CertiK Alert · BNB Chain
OpenPGP-signed. The signed text of this advisory verifies against the 0xCERT key CCC7 D9EC 9415 723D.
Published 2026-11-04 · last updated 2026-11-05
curl -s https://www.0xcert.com/pgp.asc | gpg --import && curl -s https://www.0xcert.com/advisory/0xCERT-2026-0309/signed.txt | gpg --verify