X100 Global on Ethereum drained of about $4.75M-$4.85M via flash-loan-funded Senate governance takeover
An attacker used flash-loaned funds to take two of X100 Global's three Senate seats and immediately execute a treasury proposal that dumped 400,000 X into an attacker-seeded pool, realising about $4.75M-$4.85M in USDT. Avoid interacting with X100 Freezer/treasury governance until the project publishes guidance.
Vuln-watch · relayed from a public source; see Source & attribution below
Summary
On 24 October 2026 X100 Global (X token, Ethereum) suffered a governance takeover. Per BlockSec Phalcon and Exvul, the attacker bought X with flash-loaned funds, froze it in the Freezer through two helper contracts to win two of the three Senate seats, and in the same transaction passed and executed a treasury proposal that swapped 400,000 X into an attacker-seeded PancakeSwap V3 X-USDT pool with minimum output set to zero, returning only about 35.68 USDT to the treasury. Blockaid separately reported that a second attacker later burned the Freezer's Uniswap V3 positions.
Affected
- X100 Global Freezer / DexTreasury governance (Senate) on Ethereum
- No fix available at time of publication; no official project statement had been issued at the time of the cited reports
Impact
BlockSec estimates the loss at about $4.75M; Exvul says the attacker realised 4.75M USDT; Blockaid reported about $4.85M USDT realised across two transactions and described the attack as still ongoing at 14:49 UTC on 24 October. Figures differ between sources, likely because they were taken at different times. Exvul attributes the root cause to applyForSenate() allowing anyone to join immediately for a 100-X fee while seats are chosen from current frozen balances, with no voting-power snapshot, stake-age delay, or execution timelock. Secondary coverage reports the X token fell more than 96%.
Recommended actions
- Do not buy, provide liquidity for, or freeze X until X100 Global publishes an incident statement
- Exchanges and wallets: flag the attacker addresses and transaction listed in the IOCs
- Protocol designers: governance that grants control from current balances must use snapshots, holding periods, and execution timelocks
Source & attribution
This 0xCERT advisory summarises alerts by BlockSec Phalcon (https://x.com/Phalcon_xyz/status/2114020331925258732), Exvul (https://x.com/exvulsec/status/2114032078996332573), and Blockaid (https://x.com/blockaid_/status/2114006384735916278). Indicators are copied from the Exvul and BlockSec alerts. Details may change; refer to the original sources for the authoritative record.
References
- https://x.com/Phalcon_xyz/status/2114020331925258732
- https://x.com/exvulsec/status/2114032078996332573
- https://x.com/blockaid_/status/2114006384735916278
- https://etherscan.io/tx/0x38c60844f1923d53fdce7d99e9bc2a2d8c73a08e793341dfbb479f8cc74d81d0
- https://news.bitcoin.com/security/x-100-global-loses-millions-as-three-seat-senate-is-hijacked/
Indicators of compromise
All IOC feeds →- address0x37541fc4a6f1ec86889ba506f51dc39f2bedd10aX100 exploit coordinator contract (per Exvul) · Ethereum
- address0x7ec2afdf3ec5964899894f8d58afa95cbb8ffd63X100 attacker (per Exvul) · Ethereum
- tx0x38c60844f1923d53fdce7d99e9bc2a2d8c73a08e793341dfbb479f8cc74d81d0X100 Senate-takeover attack transaction (per BlockSec Phalcon and Exvul) · Ethereum
OpenPGP-signed. The signed text of this advisory verifies against the 0xCERT key CCC7 D9EC 9415 723D.
Published 2026-10-24 · last updated 2026-10-25
curl -s https://www.0xcert.com/pgp.asc | gpg --import && curl -s https://www.0xcert.com/advisory/0xCERT-2026-0273/signed.txt | gpg --verify