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Medium0xCERT-2026-0263·

NemTokenV2 (NEM) on BNB Chain exploited for about $822k via LP sell-recycle accounting flaw

SlowMist and CertiK report that the NemTokenV2 ($NEM) contract on BNB Chain was exploited for about $822k. The attacker repeated transfer, skim and flushLpSellRecycle 42 times to burn the PancakeSwap USDT/NEM pair reserves, then sold NEM for USDT. Avoid the pool until the project remediates.

Vuln-watch · relayed from the DeFiLlama hacks database; see Source & attribution below

Affected chainsBNB Chain

Summary

On 22 October 2026 SlowMist's threat-intelligence team reported that the NemTokenV2 ($NEM) token contract on BNB Chain was exploited for about $821,920. CertiK Alert separately flagged the exploit, estimating losses of about $820,000. Per SlowMist, the attacker abused the token's LP sell-recycle accounting to burn reserves from the PancakeSwap USDT/NEM pair and then sold NEM at the inflated price for USDT.

Affected

  • NemTokenV2 ($NEM) token contract on BNB Chain (0x9cf0e3ad4efa7ab602d7b5a38c55795cfa777777) and its PancakeSwap USDT/NEM pair (0x840e19dcca541ee0b55a3c67e900a39d523b12b8)
  • No fix available at time of publication

Impact

Per SlowMist, NemTokenV2 credited transfers into the LP pair as sell volume without verifying swap settlement. These credits stayed valid after the transferred tokens were removed via skim(), allowing flushLpSellRecycle() to burn pre-existing LP reserves. The attacker repeated transfer, skim and flush 42 times, lowering the pair's NEM reserves, then sold the remaining NEM to extract USDT. Exploitation in the wild is confirmed, with losses of about $821,920 borne by the pair's liquidity providers. Media reports citing the alerts say the attacker bridged proceeds to Ethereum.

Recommended actions

  • Do not provide liquidity to, or trade against, the NEM/USDT pair until the project publishes a remediation.
  • Exchanges and bridges should screen the attacker address and attack contract listed as indicators.
  • Developers of tokens with custom LP-transfer hooks should make sure sell accounting is credited only for settled swaps and cannot be replayed after skim().

Source & attribution

This 0xCERT advisory summarises a disclosure by SlowMist (SlowMist TI Alert): https://x.com/SlowMist_Team/status/2113206749524316486, corroborated by CertiK Alert as reported by Crypto Briefing: https://cryptobriefing.com/certik-nem-token-exploit-820k-pancakeswap/. Details may change; refer to the original source for the authoritative record.

Indicators of compromise

All IOC feeds →
  • address0x5e6d1f40be466dd2facc94a26818948ecd3b1ca2
  • address0xfd929b0f270dfea6c4827262b4e2bf6ea50fe9b6
  • tx0xfb093c96c0094cbcca10801f97ed2e5ed3d96550ce64b544df5a349545723f91

OpenPGP-signed. The signed text of this advisory verifies against the 0xCERT key CCC7 D9EC 9415 723D.

Published 2026-10-22 · last updated 2026-10-22

curl -s https://www.0xcert.com/pgp.asc | gpg --import && curl -s https://www.0xcert.com/advisory/0xCERT-2026-0263/signed.txt | gpg --verify