-----BEGIN PGP SIGNED MESSAGE----- Hash: SHA512 0xCERT Security Advisory 0xCERT-2026-0365 ============================================================ Advisory-ID: 0xCERT-2026-0365 Severity: High Published: 2026-11-16T22:47:52.000Z Updated: 2026-11-17T12:42:07.245Z Chains: Ethereum, Bitcoin, Solana, BNB Chain, Other / Multi-chain URL: https://www.0xcert.com/advisory/0xCERT-2026-0365 Title: Optimizely Web supply-chain attack served crypto address swapper and card skimmer on 178 sites incl. Ledger Summary - ------- On 16 Nov 2026 an attacker injected JavaScript into Optimizely Web projects of 178 organisations, including Ledger and other crypto/trading sites. It swapped copied wallet addresses for attacker addresses, skimmed cards and stole cookies. Block the IOCs and re-verify any address copied from an affected site. Details - ------- Summary On 16 November 2026 an attacker added a malicious loader to the Project JavaScript field of Optimizely Web customer projects, so Optimizely's own CDN (cdn.optimizely.com) served it to every visitor of the affected sites. Report URI (Scott Helme) found the code in 188 of 1,611 Optimizely snippets checked, belonging to 178 organisations, including Ledger, IG, OANDA / Coinpass, Interactive Investor and TMS Brokers in the crypto & trading group, as well as Zoom, BBC, CNN, Salesforce, GitLab and HSBC. Optimizely confirmed that an unauthorized party exploited a vulnerability in Experimentation to add malicious JavaScript to some customer projects, and says it has fixed the vulnerability and removed the injected code. Affected - - Visitors to sites whose Optimizely Web snippet carried the loader, roughly 04:21 to 21:52 UTC on 16 November 2026 (about 16 hours for most sites, per StepSecurity) - - Optimizely Web Experimentation customer projects (including snippets served from customers' own domains) - - Fixed: Optimizely says the vulnerability is fixed and injected code removed; the payload host 1688360.cc was put on registry hold at 00:37 UTC on 17 November Impact The payload (track.js from 1688360.cc) replaces cryptocurrency addresses for ETH, TRX, BTC, TON, SOL, LTC, BCH and DOGE with checksum-valid attacker addresses when nearby text contains payment words such as wallet, deposit or send. It rewrites page text, form inputs, copy events, the clipboard API and fetch/XHR bodies, so an address copied from an affected page may already be swapped when pasted into a wallet. After a swap it exfiltrates a screenshot, non-HttpOnly cookies and the original addresses to /hit.php; a separate block skims card number, expiry and CVV to /card.php. On iPhones and iPads it loads the Coruna and DarkSword iOS exploit kits from .icu hosts, per Report URI. Exploitation in the wild is confirmed: Report URI counted about $7,040 received by the attacker wallets by 19:25 UTC on 16 November; Bitquery puts confirmed victim payments lower (about $2,260), so loss figures differ between sources. StepSecurity reports the BTC, LTC and ETH addresses were emptied on 17 November. One loader variant hides the URL in base64 and another carries the payload inline with an eval fallback, so blocking the domain alone does not remove it. Recommended actions - - Users: if you copied a deposit or withdrawal address on an affected site on 16 November, verify where funds went; always check the destination on your wallet or hardware-wallet screen. - - Exchanges, brokers and wallet providers using Optimizely Web: read the Project JavaScript field of every project (do not rely on searching for 1688360), review Optimizely users and API tokens, and ask Optimizely which projects were modified. - - Block the domains, URL and addresses below; search proxy/DNS logs back to 04:00 UTC on 16 November. - - Treat cards entered and iOS devices (18.6 or earlier, or 17 and earlier) used on affected sites in that window as potentially compromised. - - The TON (UQAgM1VqSZQiJLSG5w-ovurq5CZdxLEK3_7CMmwALTA5e09p) and BCH (qzkaaf8n6grmpr0d9lx8xutn3r9lk722f566hhpe58) replacement addresses listed by both sources should also be blocked; they had no transactions per StepSecurity. Source & attribution This 0xCERT advisory summarises research by Scott Helme / Report URI: https://blog.report-uri.com/worlds-largest-brands-infected-with-malware-via-optimizely/, the StepSecurity analysis by Owais Shaikh: https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/optimjack-optimizely-hosted-scripts-crypto-clipper-card-skimmer, and Optimizely's status notice: https://status.optimizely.com/incidents/ftw0fh9wx43z. Wallet addresses and domains are taken verbatim from both write-ups. Details may change; refer to the original sources for the authoritative record. References - ---------- - - https://blog.report-uri.com/worlds-largest-brands-infected-with-malware-via-optimizely/ - - https://www.stepsecurity.io/blog/optimjack-optimizely-hosted-scripts-crypto-clipper-card-skimmer - - https://status.optimizely.com/incidents/ftw0fh9wx43z - - https://bitquery.io/investigations/optimizely-hack Verify with the 0xCERT OpenPGP key: https://www.0xcert.com/pgp.asc Fingerprint: 5F94 3ED1 1E50 CF31 2128 C493 CCC7 D9EC 9415 723D -----BEGIN PGP SIGNATURE----- wrsEARYKAG0Fgmr8pSoJEDe9Tbcr+ZxrRRQAAAAAABwAIHNhbHRAbm90YXRp b25zLm9wZW5wZ3Bqcy5vcmd4J8qRq26/J56pz+/5UK/PYHElgkrL8zCY7mKx mGnLZBYhBGCkkFZbJcT5QWu27ze9Tbcr+ZxrAADPpwD+PU3A9RFgeHnSzDzl HvW+YsdSHPsagZoegIz7H/7h1tkBANOX2conT5MUGdBac7iyToVj5yizzcMa uOZX9ke8W/QK =txfG -----END PGP SIGNATURE-----